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Fordham Competition Law Institute
Course for Agency Economists
June 16-20, 2008


Monday, June 16
Morning Oligopolies/information exchanges and other facilitating practices
• information exchanges/other facilitating practices and competition in oligopolistic markets
Instructor: George Hay, Cornell Law School

Afternoon Mergers
• Refresher re basics economic concepts: e.g., market definition, market power & critical loss analysis
• Empirical techniques, econometric tools, including cases where “simple” econometrics have been used
• Theories of harm  Sean Ennis, OECD;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp


Tuesday, June 17
Morning  Mergers (cont'd)
Instructor: Sean Ennis, OECD;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp

Afternoon Mergers (cont'd)
• Unilateral effects in merger control Economist,
Instructor: U.S. Federal Trade Commission [invited]
 

Wednesday, June 18
Morning  Dynamic modeling:  applications to mergers and antitrust cases  
Instructor: Luis Cabral, NYU Stern School of Business

Afternoon  Single firm conduct
• Concepts and theories of harm in single firm conduct cases;
• “Hot topics” from the Commission’s draft article 82 guidelines 
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp


Thursday, June 19
Morning  Single firm conduct (cont’d)
• Discounts, tying and bundling Patrick Greenlee, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp

Afternoon Interactions and working relationships at competition agencies between economists and attorneys
“Code of conduct” for empirical work by economists Patrick Greenlee, Department of Justice Antitrust Division;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp


Friday, June 20
Morning  Network industries & two sided markets,The example of payment systems
Instructor: Marc Rysman, BU

Afternoon  IPRs & standard setting
Recent cases & economic theories 
Instructor: Marc Rysman, BU