Fordham Competition Law Institute
Course for Agency Economists
June 16-20, 2008
Monday, June 16
Morning Oligopolies/information exchanges and other facilitating practices
• information exchanges/other facilitating practices and competition in oligopolistic markets
Instructor: George Hay, Cornell Law School
Afternoon Mergers
• Refresher re basics economic concepts: e.g., market definition, market power & critical loss analysis
• Empirical techniques, econometric tools, including cases where “simple” econometrics have been used
• Theories of harm Sean Ennis, OECD;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp
Tuesday, June 17
Morning Mergers (cont'd)
Instructor: Sean Ennis, OECD;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp
Afternoon Mergers (cont'd)
• Unilateral effects in merger control Economist,
Instructor: U.S. Federal Trade Commission [invited]
Wednesday, June 18
Morning Dynamic modeling: applications to mergers and antitrust cases
Instructor: Luis Cabral, NYU Stern School of Business
Afternoon Single firm conduct
• Concepts and theories of harm in single firm conduct cases;
• “Hot topics” from the Commission’s draft article 82 guidelines
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp
Thursday, June 19
Morning Single firm conduct (cont’d)
• Discounts, tying and bundling Patrick Greenlee, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp
Afternoon Interactions and working relationships at competition agencies between economists and attorneys
“Code of conduct” for empirical work by economists Patrick Greenlee, Department of Justice Antitrust Division;
Instructor: Miguel de la Mano, European Commission, DG Comp
Friday, June 20
Morning Network industries & two sided markets,The example of payment systems
Instructor: Marc Rysman, BU
Afternoon IPRs & standard setting
Recent cases & economic theories
Instructor: Marc Rysman, BU